Prof.Dr. Engin Kara writes: "From Kidney Exchanges to Property Deeds: A Proposal for Solving the Property Problem"
Kıbrıs Postası columnist Prof. Dr. Engin Kara writes about Cyprus property dispute...
Those who follow my posts on Facebook will have seen the posts I shared last week about returning to the Republic of Cyprus. Undoubtedly, the most difficult part of this return is the property issue. It has been at the centre of every negotiation for fifty years, and every time it is referred to a “comprehensive settlement.”
I will begin this article with one assumption: There is political will. If so, the rest is a technical problem and falls within the realm of economics. Our job also becomes easier because there is already a model that has solved a similar technical problem.
When I ask myself how, two economists of Turkish origin come to mind: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver. Together with Nobel laureate Alvin Roth, they designed a system for kidney transplantation. Today, thousands of lives are being saved in many countries thanks to this system.
Kidney Exchange
The problem is this: A patient needs a kidney, and their spouse is willing to donate one, but they are not tissue-compatible. In another city, there is another couple in the same situation. If there is cross-compatibility, the donors can switch places; both patients receive a kidney.
Two-way matching is rare. Sönmez, Ünver and Roth’s contribution was to move matching beyond pairs and into cycles and chains. A’s donor gives a kidney to B, B’s donor to C, and C’s donor to A. A chain initiated by a donor who expects nothing in return can make dozens of consecutive transplants possible. As the pool grows, the number of cases resolved increases exponentially.
All without money: Selling kidneys is illegal, but exchanges are possible. The situation is no different for many families who cannot contemplate “selling” their ancestral home.
What I propose is to adapt this logic to the property problem in Cyprus: without forcing anyone and without making anyone lose.
An Example for Cyprus
Let us imagine four families:
Ahmet owns a house in Limassol, but has been living in Kyrenia, in a house belonging to Andreas, since 1974.
Andreas owns that house in Kyrenia; he himself lives in Paphos, in a house belonging to Mehmet.
Mehmet owns that house in Paphos; he himself lives in northern Nicosia, in a house built on land belonging to Eleni.
Eleni owns that land; she herself lives in Limassol, in Ahmet’s house.
All four want to remain where they have lived for half a century. But none of the four owns the property they are living in; no two-way negotiation can produce a solution.
If they are in the same pool, a four-way exchange would give everyone the title deed to the house they live in. No one moves. Fifty years of de facto reality becomes a legal reality with four signatures.
The system has two basic rules. First, no one ends up worse off than they are today: No change you do not accept can be imposed on you. Second, everyone can say no. Those who say no are not penalised; they remain in the pool, and the algorithm looks for a new chain for them in each round.
How Would It Be Established in Cyprus?
Under the umbrella of the Republic of Cyprus, with the support of the UN and the EU, there would be a single, bi-communal property exchange centre. Property owners and users would register voluntarily; independent valuation would convert each property into a score, while differences in value would be covered by a compensation fund; the algorithm would regularly identify cycles and chains. Today, the Immovable Property Commission in the north and the Ministry of Interior, which acts as the guardian of Turkish Cypriot properties in the south, operate separately; cases are handled one by one. This is like looking for a compatible kidney separately in every hospital.
Expanding the Pool
There are far more Greek Cypriot-owned properties in the north than Turkish Cypriot-owned properties in the south. Exchange will not solve the entire problem. But being unable to solve all of it should not be a reason for solving none of it.
Moreover, this imbalance is not destiny. Let us remember the fundamental lesson of kidney exchange: As the pool grows, the number of solutions increases. The goal is to expand the pool.
There are public lands in both the north and south of the island that could be opened for development. The British bases could also be added: Britain has previously stated that it is prepared to return approximately half of the base territory in the event of a settlement.
Each would mean a new “donor” entering the pool: new cycles, new chains, and fewer cases left requiring cash compensation. Opening a piece of land for development would cost the budget virtually nothing, provided that the value created goes into the pool rather than to private individuals.
The logic of chains could also resolve the most difficult question in the negotiations: Who should take priority, the owner or the user?
A Greek Cypriot owner wants his house back; a Turkish Cypriot family lives in it. A “donor” property in the pool, a piece of public land opened for development, or a plot returned from the British bases could provide that family with a house of at least equal value. The family moves, and the owner returns to his home. No one loses. The land bank does not merely pay compensation; it also makes restitution possible.
The Bosnia experience is valuable here. Those displaced during the war were granted the right to reclaim their pre-war properties; by 2004, approximately 93 percent of claims had resulted in the restitution of property. However, a significant proportion of those who reclaimed their properties did not return and settle there, but instead sold, exchanged or rented them out.
In other words, the right to return does not mean that everyone will return. In my view, this shows that recognising the right can also free people to make another choice. That is precisely what the system I am proposing aims to achieve: Those who want to return should be able to return; those who do not should be able to choose an exchange or compensation.
The Difficult Part
Returning to the Republic of Cyprus would create a single title-deed system; the problem of recognition would disappear. The real challenge is technical: merging the records, establishing a valuation board trusted by both communities, and creating a compensation fund. But we are not starting from zero. The Immovable Property Commission has experience; the Greek Cypriot side has also, since July 2025, moved to a points-based system based on measurable criteria for the allocation of Turkish Cypriot properties in the south. The infrastructure has already begun to take shape.
One final point: time. The generation of 1974 in Cyprus is now in its late seventies or eighties. Every year, there are people who die without seeing what happens to their property, and with each death, the problem is divided among dozens of heirs. Waiting is not neutral.
For fifty years, property has been regarded as the biggest obstacle to a settlement in every negotiation. Kidney exchange shows something else: A system designed with the right rules can bring people home step by step, without forcing anyone and without making anyone lose. This system turns the question of “who will win, the owner or the user?” into “how many cases can we resolve without anyone losing?”
I do not want to lengthen the article by going into more detail about the proposal. But I need to underline one point: I began the article with the assumption that there is political will. It is clear where this will needs to be sought. Returning to the Republic of Cyprus is not anyone’s favour; it is already a basis accepted by the world and by the Greek Cypriot side. If the Greek Cypriot side opposes this, it would amount to denying the strategy it has pursued since 1964. Therefore, the answer to the question of political will lies on the Turkish Cypriot side. Once the data are shared, how the system would work and what it would cost can be tested through simulations within a short period of time.
Finally, a personal note. The property issue is, at least for me, a deep wound. It does not matter whether you live in Britain, America or Australia; you carry the burden of the Greek Cypriot properties on your shoulders. We have no eye on anyone else’s property. A debt is a debt.
The life-saving idea of two economists of Turkish origin may perhaps also help heal a fifty-year-old wound in Cyprus.
Comments
Attention!
Sending all kinds of financial, legal, criminal, administrative responsibility content arising from illegal, threatening, disturbing, insulting and abusive, humiliating, humiliating, vulgar, obscene, immoral, damaging personal rights or similar content. It belongs to the Member / Members.